About Cassandra

Scientific Prophecies: Cassandra vs. Latour

Since good governance is based on sound science, questions about the role of science are pivotal; in particular, which means can help bridge the gap between ‘scientific prophecies’ and environmental politics? The idea of climate change and the consequences of environmental destruction have been described and explained in thousands of articles, books and documentaries.

“Often, however, we dismiss bearers of bad news or inconvenient truths until the point of crisis, when reality can no longer be evaded. The mythical figure of Cassandra and the Old Testament prophet Jeremiah were fated to be ignored” (Orr 2009:Loc. 76-81).

How do experts on the environment resemble Cassandra and Jeremiah? Both are particularly tragic figures. Whilst Cassandra is able to foresee the future, she is cursed not to be believed. Although trusted to a certain extent, environmental scientists are largely ignored, which in consequence makes no difference for the environment. Drastic reductions in greenhouse gases within less than a decade are required in order to avoid tipping points that will make the planet uninhabitable for the next century. Hence, radical change is urgent.[1] Cassandra predicted the destruction of Troy. Many scientists fear the destruction of Earth’s life support systems. God chose Jeremiah to tell the people about the consequences of their sins, nonetheless he was reluctant to do so. From an ecological standpoint today’s consumption can clearly be described as sin. In both stories disaster was not diverted, but it could have been, if and only if the people listened, believed and acted. Predictions about the upcoming catastrophe are not made by a god or even by an overarching authority (Höffe 2009:167).[2] Scientists are relatively powerless. The man who leaves Plato’s cave and returns equally tells a story about the unwillingness of humans to accept ‘truth’ and change (1982).[3] The majority of scientific disciplines is quite separated from everyday life and functions relatively independent. Environmental science, however, has some unique qualities.

“The controversy in question is not of the kind that is normal in scientific communities as investigators test and challenge findings and hypotheses. Rather, it puts scientists in a pitched battle fought on very public terrain, with powerful political interests financing attacks on the integrity, content, and process of climate science — along with personal attacks on its practitioners. There are people who have much to lose if the overwhelming consensus among climate scientists is right: their lifestyles, their profits, and, in some cases, their livelihoods” (Dryzek et al. 2013:Loc. 227; Lane 2011b).

So far scientists appear to be the tragic figures from these mythological stories. The comparisons reveal the seriousness as well as the dilemma most environmentalists face. Environmental destruction is irresponsible and irrational (Baber and Bartlett 2005). Scientists have sufficient knowledge in many areas, yet lack the power to change the set course. The ways in which human beings destroy nature are known well enough.

What is more, even if it was true that human activities had no influence on the climate per se, politics would still have to react. If pollution did not lead to climate change, it still causes enough damage and suffering. Whether or not there will be an extreme transformation of global weather conditions, resources still need to be protected and used wisely. Of course, arguments regarding the future always contain an element of speculation.[4] Given the status quo of the environment and current tendencies, distressing predictions are not prophecy, but based on mathematical calculations. Höffe reminds his readers that there is a difference between utopia, vision and dystopia (2009:190ff.). He emphasizes that smart politics need a vision or it will lack the agency to create something and barely react. One could imagine Cassandra and Jeremiah being equipped with substantial power to make people revise their behaviour – the earlier discussions established that beliefs are not enough. Meriting such change in agency could transform them from being observers into active ‘agents of change’.

By definition democratic politics do not follow the demands of scientists. In the end scientists have the same guaranteed decision-making power as a shopkeeper, a baker, or anybody else above the age of 18 or 21.[5] Deliberative democracy supports civic science as an important pillar. Representative democracy trusts in delegation for the understanding of scientific findings. Levelling playing fields means also indiscrimination between expertise and ignorance. Democracy advocates sustain their arguments by insisting on political equality.

“One practical argument for democracy is that infallible green policies will not simply drop like apples from a theory of value, so the means of reaching decisions do matter. Those arguments that defend the use of non-democratic methods often contain an implicit technocratic assumption that a governing elite of politicians, scientists and professionals knows best” (Carter 2007:54; see also Mill 1862).

It is indisputable that Cassandra, Jeremiah and Plato’s cave returnee know better. It is also indisputable that climate scientists have a better grasp of the climate than other citizens. If not science would be useless. On the other hand, Dahl writes that “[n]o intellectually defensible claim can be made that policy elites (actual and putative) possess superior moral knowledge or more specifically superior knowledge of what constitutes the public good” (Dahl 1989:337).[6] There are two reservations to this claim. First, this work provides a clear idea of an indispensable public good. Natural scientists attain superior knowledge of this public good since they have a deeper understanding of sustainability (see also Bowersox 2002). Following Beck, Hannigan writes about contemporary risks that they are “largely invisible to lay people, identifiable only through sophisticated scientific instrumentation” (2006:23).[7] Scientists are better prepared to realise unavoidable measures so as to protect the commons. Since being affected is a clear barrier to abstract reasoning, scientists gain even further grounds in handling difficult situations.[8] The ‘unaffected’ scientist is more likely to engage in the required reasoning, since consequentialist thinking that considers the common good is “psychologically difficult for people in a number of predictable way” (McShane 2014:30).[9] Once the common good is identified some form of instrumental rationality (with precaution) needs to be applied. Scientists can adjudicate between different policies in regard to sustainability as a moral end. In view of that, many scholars wish for a greater role of science; including prediction and evaluation of policy goals (see for example Lemons 1998:94f.). Dahl himself admits that governments need the help of experts (2000:78). However, ensured expertise is typically found in those institutions that could be regarded as less democratic and constraining democracy such as a constitutional court (Bell and Li 2013, Pettit 2013).[10] Pralle makes the suggestions that “[d]ifferent indicators may have to be selected for different audiences, depending on the effects that most worry them, but clarity of communication and ease of understanding should be a priority” (2009:789). In spite of its prevalence in consumer culture, such a process could be presented as manipulation by liberals and conservatives alike, when employed by science and policy experts.[11] In this case, it is difficult to maintain a difference between the rule of scientists and the vote by people whose choices have been strategically shaped by comprehensive psychological research. Second, those trained in ethics may in fact be uniquely equipped to know what is good for everyone and to develop policies accordingly. While a consequentialist environmentalist utilises science to think about the good, the public typically has private preferences (De-Shalit 2001). Despite the wide consensus among scientists about anthropogenic climate change, political entrepreneurs cherry pick from the vast research (Dryzek et al. 2013:Loc. 435).[12] So far, “science is expected to fall in line with the policy priorities of the government of the day” (Dryzek 2005:82), instead of priorities being set by an understanding of reality. Pralle’s suggestion could be feasible and might show effects. It does neither foster transparency nor represent a deeper trust in the people’s capacity to comprehend the actual issue.

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[1]    Late action makes mitigation and adaptation more difficult: “Flying, driving, heating our homes, using our appliances, basically everything we do, would need to be zero carbon – and note, zero carbon means zero carbon. Carbon capture and storage could not, as we understand them today, get near to delivering this” (Anderson 2012:25).

[2]    The incumbent pope talks about climate change as a problem. The actual impact is likely to be minor, but hard to estimate. At least a moderate (potentially only short-term) effect on the views of Christian Americans for example was observed by a joint study of George Mason University and Yale (Maibach et al. 2015).

[3]     As discussed earlier, cognition plays a core role.

[4]   Scientists are unsure, if tipping points are already passed or if it can be avoided that change will be dictated out of necessity because of biophysical limits. At the end “all of the computer models, scientific predictions, and economic scenarios are constructed around the most important and uncertain variable of all: whether our collective choice will be to accept or to deny what the science is telling us” (Marshall 2014:Loc. 97).

[5]    “The sad fact is that citizens in electoral democracies won’t even question their right to choose their political rulers, no matter how intellectually incompetent or morally insensitive their political judgment may be” (Bell 2015:Loc. 3265).

[6]     Critiques against the concept of such meritocratic decision-making are common. Huxley jokes: “There seems to be a touching belief among certain PhD’s in sociology that PhD’s in sociology will never be corrupted by power. Like Sir Galahad’s, their strength is as the strength of ten because their heart is pure — and their heart is pure because they are scientists and have taken six thousand hours of social studies” (2000:66). Heilbroner also warns that the social scientist morally involved and intertwined with his subject (1976:15). In his elaborations on happiness, Marcuse writes that even the purest philosophy is followed by a ‘swamp of dirty disciples’ (2006:69f.; my translation). Admittedly, power could be as corruptive as many sayings assume and the question if training can channel such tendencies needs to be studied. Still, one might assume that there is a difference in truth claims between scientists and entrepreneurs (cf. Radcliffe 2002:7f.).

[7]    Hall stresses that “a large part of the reason why the consequences of our choices are unidentified is because they affect things that are not in our ordinary range of vision: people we don’t know and never will, future generations not yet living, elements of ecosystems that we don’t see or interact with in our daily lives” (2010:72). Baber and Bartlett comment: “It would seem that now is not the time for experts to go missing in action” (2005:Loc. 2345).

[8] “All that the mathematician requires […] is at least one other mathematician to recognise the validity of his proof. In order to assure itself of the thought that it is, love needs only assume the two. The artist ultimately needs no one. Science, art and love are aristocratic truth procedures” (Badiou 2004:142).

[9]   ‘Unaffected’ here is meant in opposition to ‘the affected’ of participative governance.

[10]  The British government employs a Government Scientific Chief Advisor. Yet, following his advice is not mandatory.

 [11]   On the other hand, “[i]f scientists choose not to engage in the public debate, we leave a vacuum that will be filled by those whose agenda is one of short-term self-interest” (Mann 2014). Thus, scholars like Giddens find not all so called ‘choice editing’ objectionable saying that for example there are “no civil liberties issue in cases where our behaviour is already being significantly influenced, or manipulated, by companies, and where the object of government policy is to counter that influence” (2009:109).

[12]  “Policy entrepreneurs should communicate that ‘the debate is over’ and should point out that the detailed climate models developed by scientists have helped them correctly predict climate change trends and impacts” (Pralle 2009:790).